Psychological Human Behavior essays

Mental Human Behavior expositions Brain science is the significant point of view for human instinct. It is a lot of significant for the individual condition. Brain science is a lot of a result of the Western custom. While another brain research of the year 2000 contains both the eastern just as the Western custom (Frey, 04/06). Clinician self-idea mentalities. Its identified with Psyche implies call a people self ideas it incorporates what an individual sees from the people the incorporate piece of human psyche movement associated with those with substantial ideas. It anyway reflects genuine connection with the psyche body idea. Perspectives AND SOCIAL COGNITION tends to those areas of social conduct in which insight assumes a significant job, including the interface of perception with clear conduct, influence, and inspiration. (Primis, 119). Significant viewpoints in Now, whats the idea of analysis is likewise a brain research now incorporates therapy, humanism and sociobiology. important point of view. As a treatment, therapy depends on perception that people are frequently uninformed of a significant number of the variables that decide their feelings and conduct. (Frey, 04/06). It is, what's more, a strategy for finding out about the psyche, and furthermore a hypothesis, a method of understanding the procedures of ordinary regular mental working and the phases of typical advancement from outset to mature age. (psychology.com). Moreover, since analysis looks to clarify how the human brain functions, it contributes understanding into whatever the human brain produces.(apa.org) Sigmund Freud was the principal psychoanalyst. A large number of his bits of knowledge into the human brain, which appeared to be so progressive when the new century rolled over, are presently generally acknowledged by most schools of mental thought. Despite the fact that others previously and during his time had started to perceive the job of oblivious mental understanding its significance. In spite of the fact that his thoughts met with enmity and opposition, Freud accepted ... <!

Far From the Madding Crowd, Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Jude the Obsc

Trading off Female Characters in Far From the Madding Crowd, Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Jude the Obscureâ â The books of Thomas Hardy are unpredictable and confused works whose plots appear to be totally arranged before the primary word is ever really shaped on paper. Despite the fact that I have no evidence of Hardy’s technique for composing, plainly he concentrates more on plot advancement than portrayal in the books Far From the Madding Crowd, Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure. The benefits of this can be effortlessly found in the smart exciting bends in the road that happen in the novel which hold the reader’s intrigue. Be that as it may, the primary explanation Hardy uses this technique, particularly in the disasters Tess and Jude, is to introduce an ethical contention to the peruser through activities done by and to the fundamental characters of the books. By mapping out the defining moments early, Hardy can control the course of his works, and they rise as a social analysis. In any case, in doing this, the characters are sentenced to an artistic des tiny. Strong focuses more on constraining the characters to complete these activities than permitting their characters to turn out to be completely and unreservedly created. Females perform the vast majority of the important however far-fetched activities, and Hardy accuses any whimsical conduct for woman’s common irregularity. Therefore, in going after a high artistic reason Hardy incidentally stunts the improvement of the principle female characters.â Jude the Obscure is intended to show the deficiencies and repercussions of strict and social shows, with an accentuation on marriage. As indicated by Hardy, fleeting motivations cause individuals to wed, which ties couples together until their demises. At the point when these sentiments of warmth blur, they should live respectively I... ...nally draw the consideration of a man she wants to be with, he transforms her character into a bother. She starts to be viewed as a comic character and less regard is given to her. She is simply one more female character used to make the hardware of Hardy's books capacity, and takes on a progressively mechanical and cliché face as a result.â Tough's expectations are respectable. He attempts to show the explanations behind giving progressively social opportunity to everybody, females specifically, however bargains their characters all the while. The books would profit by a long shot if there was a progressively unconstrained air and the characters were permitted free rule to create unhindered, yet the books could bring about the loss of such incredible good messages. Thus, changing the characters could jeopardize the books' significance ever, however would improve the general understanding experience.

Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations

Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Academic Discipline: International Relations Course Name: IR Theory Assignment Subject: Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Academic Level: Graduate Referencing Style: MLA Word Count: 1,567 A productive assumption informing much of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis since the 1950s has been the pursuit of rationality by utility maximizing actors. While rationalism has provided a ‘policy-relevant’ means of not only interpreting the endless complexity of international politics, but also predicting likely future behaviour â€" it is increasingly questionable whether such assumptions are adequate. Academics interested in the foreign-policy psychology have questioned the presumed rationality of policy actors while interrogating the intersections of various levels of analysis â€" for example, the individual, the state and the system writ large. This paper examines one aspect of this interrogation: the study of emotion. In conducting this analysis, this paper will argue that the discipline requires a greater appreciation of the links between mind and body, and between emotion and rationality. Indeed, the discipline of international relations is argua bly well-situated to question whether reason and emotion truly exist in opposition at all. The relationship between affect (embodied impetus to act) and emotion has a long history in sociology and neuroscience, and while this paper cannot hope to do justice to the nuances and breadth of these analyses, it can touch on some central arguments that might be engaged productively in the study of international relations and foreign policy. The affective systems in the brain are functionally linked to the cognitive processes often framed as the solitary seat of reason; these functional links are intrinsic to our capacity to manifest rationality. This insight undermines rationalist approaches that not only presume a non-emotive rationality, but also assume that such a rationality is desirable. Emotion from this standpoint does not stand in opposition to rationality, but is actually a condition of its existence (see Mercer 2005). Given the willingness of individuals â€" consider suicide bombing â€" to kill themselves for an ideal (whatever that ideal may be), a central question of international relations should be whether rationalism and utility maximization can adequately capture the psychological and social motives behind such forms of political agency. By treating emotion as a functionally necessary component of rationality, it may be possible to better analyze emotional dynamics that are inherent in human commitments to socially constructed structures such as the state, or political parties. If our ability to act rationally is linked to emotion, then rationality itself must be linked to identities and the social structures they often embody. Therefore, by taking emotion seriously as a productive and necessary part of our capacity to understand and act in the world, we gain potential insight into identity formation, and how differing social dynamics at different levels of analysis may lead to different claims about what is normal and rational in the study and practice of international politics. Treating reason and emotion in opposition to one another has a history in Western thought stretching back to Plato and Aristotle (Damasio 1994: 170-171). This conflictual relation between the two phenomena is reflected in contemporary scholarship in the presupposition that reason’s role is to tame, or eliminate emotion from influencing rational deliberation; non-emotive reasoning is therefore considered essential to rational assessment (2000: 222-223; see also Marcus 2003: 183; Elster 1999: 55-76). More specifically, this assumption regarding reason’s primacy over emotion is reflected in international relations and foreign policy analysis via the assumption that it is a pre-condition to optimal political judgement in decision-making contexts; severing emotion from reason in decision-making rationality is considered necessary to efficiently linking means to ends (Marcus 2003: 185). It is evident therefore that any definition of emotion will fail to be satisfying to every scholar. Epistemic commitments, disciplinary considerations, and specific methodologies will undermine the appeal of emotion for certain bodies of scholarship (see Crawford 2000; Fineman 2004). Rose McDermott defines emotion as the following: “Emotion is one of a large set of differentiated biologically based complex conditions that are about something” (2004a, 692). This definition has the advantage offering multiple possible means of deploying the concept of emotion to the study of politics. Academics can assert emotion’s physiological dynamics, its aspects that are socially constructed, or some combination of both. Biologically, emotions are generated by changes in relevant body systems â€" the musculo-skeletal, the nervous system, the endocrine system, and the neurotransmitter and neuroactive peptide systems â€" whose interaction mobilizes and disposes humans to act in particular ways (see McDermott 2004a; Turner 2007: 2). Here, emotions are complex physiological responses to stimuli (external or internal). Emotions are activated via affective systems in the brain processing information and recognizing significance; this recognition produces an automatic behavioural response that contextualizes and informs subsequent cognitive processing. Emotions can also be understood as socially constructed. In this approach, emotions are produced, defined and re-iterated via socialization. Emotions here are shaped by cultural context (Crawford 2000: 128; Fattah Fierke 2009: 69-70). A key argument from this perspective is that the because the beliefs, judgments and desires characteristic of emotion are ultimately contingent, they will vary depending upon social context. Furthermore, cultural contextualization of emotion acts to restrain certain behaviours, while endorsing other cultural values. Therefore, when speaking of a specific emotion such as shame, the substance or meaning of the emotion will have differing understandings depending upon time and place (Cohen Kitayama 2007: 847-850). Moreover, even if one makes the assumption that emotions are universal and unvarying, the subjects and objects to which these emotions are related will be contingent. As Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke argue: “… emotions [are] socially meanin gful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions … The central question is how experiences are given emotional meaning and how this meaning legitimizes certain forms of action, and thereby shapes future interactions” (2009: 70). A final take on the study of emotion in international relations can be utilized that subdivides emotion into emotions and feelings. Here emotion represents the physiologically derived capacity to emote, and feelings the socially constructed aspect of the concept (Damasio 1994). The value in adopting this method is that emotion is viewed as a biologically innate and universal aspect of human thought, and that its arousal is context specific depending upon the subjectivity of the individual and the contexts and experiences that shaped that subjectivity (see Bechara, A.; Damasio, H.; Tranel, D. Damasio, A. R. 1997). Regarding the relation between affect and cognition, Andrew Ross argues: This work lends itself to more open-ended applications and is attentive to the complex mixing of biological and social processes. These sources thus offer constructivists not irrefutable evidence but contestable insights into biological dimensions of social processes. These insights might be used to formulate non-deterministic, historically informed inferences about the role of affect in political life (2006: 204). Emotion is therefore a potentially productive means of linking the material and the social, and in so-doing provides a novel means of better understanding the identity-based dispositions of decisionmakers. Where emotions were once understood as “unimportant outcomes of ‘cold’ cognitive processes, lacking adaptive value at best or constituting maladaptive functioning at worst … it is now clear that emotions are useful as organizational constructs, lending clarity to the relationship between various aspects of situations and an organism’s responses to those situations” (1984: 256). The ontogenetic process of identity formation in all humans is therefore linked to this emotional/cognitive evolution; as we pass through life context and bodily response form mental shortcuts for later assessments of what feels positive or negative about a given context or phenomena (McDermott 2004b: 163). Emotions are therefore central elements in human’s adaptation to social contexts â€" t hey are functionally vital to any capacity for rationality in decision-making. In neuroscientific studies, the affective components of emotion have been found to precede cognitive deliberation. In this way emotions have been found to autonomically simplify cognitively complex situations to produce a more manageable array of choices for decisionmakers. Yet these conscious and unconscious emotional dynamics are also necessary for our social functioning. Jonathan Mercer notes that “People without emotion may know they should be ethical, and may know they should be influenced by norms, and may know that they should not make disastrous financial decisions, but this knowledge is abstract and inert and does not weigh on their decisions (Mercer 2005: 93). Mercer’s argument is that emotion is vital for an actor to relate to social structures; lacking emotionality, actors find themselves socially incapable of functioning appropriately. The study of foreign policy has stressed the failure policymakers to achieve optimal rationality; rationality here being understood as contextualized by “simplified subjective representations of reality” (Tetlock McGuire 2005: 485). The beliefs and expectations that are evident in decision-making have been found to be significantly shaped by a priori assumptions; that is, as Robert Jervis argues, “… actors tend to perceive what they expect” (2005: 463). Thus, cognitivists argue that familiarity a given social context shapes how a given agent is likely to perceive others (Jervis 2005: 471). In conclusion, it is obvious that the above approaches fixate upon errors in judgement, with emotionality contributing solely to these errors. It is also evident that treating emotion as potentially productive and invariably unavoidable to the study of politics and international relations can provide new interpretations and expectations regarding the human capacity for change, how we are enculturated to feel intensely about abstract concepts, and ultimately why social constructs such as the state or ‘nation’ are capable of motivating individuals to obscene acts of violence including a willingness to sacrifice one’s own life in their name. Works Cited: Bechara, A.; Damasio, H.; Tranel, D.; Damasio, A. R. “Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.” Science, 275.5304 (1997): 1293-1294. Blight, James G. The Shattered Crystal Ball New York: Rowan Littlefield, 1990. Blight, James G. Brenner, Philip. Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers and the Missile Crisis. New York: Rowan Littlefield, 2002. Campos, Joseph J. Barrett, Karen C. “Toward a New Understanding of Emotions and their Development.” in Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan Robert E. Zajonc (eds.), Emotions, Cognition and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Cassino, Dan Lodge, Milton. “The Primacy of Affect in Political Evaluations” in W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Cringler Michael Mackuen (eds.) The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Cohen, Dov Kityayama, Shinobu. “Cultural Psychology: This Stanza and the Next.” in Shinobu Kitayama Dov Cohen (eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York: The Gulford Press, 2007. Crawford, Neta. “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” International Security 24 (2000): 116-156. Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994. Elster, Jon. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fattah, Khaled Fierke, K.M. “A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East.” European Journal of Political Science. 15.1 (2009): 67â€"93 Faizullaev, Alisher. “Diplomacy and Self.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17 (2006): 497â€"522. Fineman, Stephan. “Getting the Measure of Emotion â€" and the Cautionary Tale of Emotional Iintelligence.” Human Relations. 57.6(2004): 719-740. Houghton, David Patrick. Political Psychology. New York: Routledge, 2008 Houghton, David Patrick. “Analogical Reasoning, Neuroscience, and Emotion: Toward a Hot Cognitive Approach.” Paper presented to ISA annual meeting February, 2009. Marcus, G.E. “Emotion in Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2000 3: 221-250. Marcus, G.E. “The Psychology of Emotion and Politics.” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.) Oxford Handbook of political psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. McDermott, Rose. “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science.” Perspectives on Politics. 4 (2004): 691-706. McDermott, Rose. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Mercer, Jonathan. “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.” International Organization 1 (2005): 77-106. Mercer, Jonathan. “Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics.” Journal of International Relations and Development. 2006 9: 288-303. Mesquita, Batja; Leu, Janxin. “The Cultural Psychology of Emotion.” in Shinobu Kitayama Dov Cohen (eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York: The Guilford Press, 2007. Neuman, W. Russell; Marcus, George E.; Cringler, Ann Mackuen, Michael. “Theorizing Affects Effects.” in W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Cringler Michael Mackuen (eds.) The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007 Ross, Andrew A. “Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions,” European Journal of International Relations 12 (2006): 197-222. Rittberger, Volker. Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theory.” Paper presented to ISA annual meeting, March 2002. Stein, Janice Gross. “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat.” Political Psychology, 2 (1988): 245-271. Tetlock, Philip McGuire, Charles. “Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy,” in John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, New York: Longman, 2005: 484-500. Voss, James F. Dorsey, Ellen. “Perception and International Relations: An Overview.” in Eric Singer Valerie Hudson (eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992. Weber, Cynthia. Faking It: U. S. Hegemony in a Post-Phallic era. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Zajonc, Robert B. “On the Primacy of Affect.” American Psychologist.” 1984 39.2 (1984): 117â€"23. Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Academic Discipline: International Relations Course Name: IR Theory Assignment Subject: Theorizing Emotion and Affect in International Relations Academic Level: Graduate Referencing Style: MLA Word Count: 1,567 A productive assumption informing much of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis since the 1950s has been the pursuit of rationality by utility maximizing actors. While rationalism has provided a ‘policy-relevant’ means of not only interpreting the endless complexity of international politics, but also predicting likely future behaviour â€" it is increasingly questionable whether such assumptions are adequate. Academics interested in the foreign-policy psychology have questioned the presumed rationality of policy actors while interrogating the intersections of various levels of analysis â€" for example, the individual, the state and the system writ large. This paper examines one aspect of this interrogation: the study of emotion. In conducting this analysis, this paper will argue that the discipline requires a greater appreciation of the links between mind and body, and between emotion and rationality. Indeed, the discipline of international relations is argua bly well-situated to question whether reason and emotion truly exist in opposition at all. The relationship between affect (embodied impetus to act) and emotion has a long history in sociology and neuroscience, and while this paper cannot hope to do justice to the nuances and breadth of these analyses, it can touch on some central arguments that might be engaged productively in the study of international relations and foreign policy. The affective systems in the brain are functionally linked to the cognitive processes often framed as the solitary seat of reason; these functional links are intrinsic to our capacity to manifest rationality. This insight undermines rationalist approaches that not only presume a non-emotive rationality, but also assume that such a rationality is desirable. Emotion from this standpoint does not stand in opposition to rationality, but is actually a condition of its existence (see Mercer 2005). Given the willingness of individuals â€" consider suicide bombing â€" to kill themselves for an ideal (whatever that ideal may be), a central question of international relations should be whether rationalism and utility maximization can adequately capture the psychological and social motives behind such forms of political agency. By treating emotion as a functionally necessary component of rationality, it may be possible to better analyze emotional dynamics that are inherent in human commitments to socially constructed structures such as the state, or political parties. If our ability to act rationally is linked to emotion, then rationality itself must be linked to identities and the social structures they often embody. Therefore, by taking emotion seriously as a productive and necessary part of our capacity to understand and act in the world, we gain potential insight into identity formation, and how differing social dynamics at different levels of analysis may lead to different claims about what is normal and rational in the study and practice of international politics. Treating reason and emotion in opposition to one another has a history in Western thought stretching back to Plato and Aristotle (Damasio 1994: 170-171). This conflictual relation between the two phenomena is reflected in contemporary scholarship in the presupposition that reason’s role is to tame, or eliminate emotion from influencing rational deliberation; non-emotive reasoning is therefore considered essential to rational assessment (2000: 222-223; see also Marcus 2003: 183; Elster 1999: 55-76). More specifically, this assumption regarding reason’s primacy over emotion is reflected in international relations and foreign policy analysis via the assumption that it is a pre-condition to optimal political judgement in decision-making contexts; severing emotion from reason in decision-making rationality is considered necessary to efficiently linking means to ends (Marcus 2003: 185). It is evident therefore that any definition of emotion will fail to be satisfying to every scholar. Epistemic commitments, disciplinary considerations, and specific methodologies will undermine the appeal of emotion for certain bodies of scholarship (see Crawford 2000; Fineman 2004). Rose McDermott defines emotion as the following: “Emotion is one of a large set of differentiated biologically based complex conditions that are about something” (2004a, 692). This definition has the advantage offering multiple possible means of deploying the concept of emotion to the study of politics. Academics can assert emotion’s physiological dynamics, its aspects that are socially constructed, or some combination of both. Biologically, emotions are generated by changes in relevant body systems â€" the musculo-skeletal, the nervous system, the endocrine system, and the neurotransmitter and neuroactive peptide systems â€" whose interaction mobilizes and disposes humans to act in particular ways (see McDermott 2004a; Turner 2007: 2). Here, emotions are complex physiological responses to stimuli (external or internal). Emotions are activated via affective systems in the brain processing information and recognizing significance; this recognition produces an automatic behavioural response that contextualizes and informs subsequent cognitive processing. Emotions can also be understood as socially constructed. In this approach, emotions are produced, defined and re-iterated via socialization. Emotions here are shaped by cultural context (Crawford 2000: 128; Fattah Fierke 2009: 69-70). A key argument from this perspective is that the because the beliefs, judgments and desires characteristic of emotion are ultimately contingent, they will vary depending upon social context. Furthermore, cultural contextualization of emotion acts to restrain certain behaviours, while endorsing other cultural values. Therefore, when speaking of a specific emotion such as shame, the substance or meaning of the emotion will have differing understandings depending upon time and place (Cohen Kitayama 2007: 847-850). Moreover, even if one makes the assumption that emotions are universal and unvarying, the subjects and objects to which these emotions are related will be contingent. As Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke argue: “… emotions [are] socially meanin gful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions … The central question is how experiences are given emotional meaning and how this meaning legitimizes certain forms of action, and thereby shapes future interactions” (2009: 70). A final take on the study of emotion in international relations can be utilized that subdivides emotion into emotions and feelings. Here emotion represents the physiologically derived capacity to emote, and feelings the socially constructed aspect of the concept (Damasio 1994). The value in adopting this method is that emotion is viewed as a biologically innate and universal aspect of human thought, and that its arousal is context specific depending upon the subjectivity of the individual and the contexts and experiences that shaped that subjectivity (see Bechara, A.; Damasio, H.; Tranel, D. Damasio, A. R. 1997). Regarding the relation between affect and cognition, Andrew Ross argues: This work lends itself to more open-ended applications and is attentive to the complex mixing of biological and social processes. These sources thus offer constructivists not irrefutable evidence but contestable insights into biological dimensions of social processes. These insights might be used to formulate non-deterministic, historically informed inferences about the role of affect in political life (2006: 204). Emotion is therefore a potentially productive means of linking the material and the social, and in so-doing provides a novel means of better understanding the identity-based dispositions of decisionmakers. Where emotions were once understood as “unimportant outcomes of ‘cold’ cognitive processes, lacking adaptive value at best or constituting maladaptive functioning at worst … it is now clear that emotions are useful as organizational constructs, lending clarity to the relationship between various aspects of situations and an organism’s responses to those situations” (1984: 256). The ontogenetic process of identity formation in all humans is therefore linked to this emotional/cognitive evolution; as we pass through life context and bodily response form mental shortcuts for later assessments of what feels positive or negative about a given context or phenomena (McDermott 2004b: 163). Emotions are therefore central elements in human’s adaptation to social contexts â€" t hey are functionally vital to any capacity for rationality in decision-making. In neuroscientific studies, the affective components of emotion have been found to precede cognitive deliberation. In this way emotions have been found to autonomically simplify cognitively complex situations to produce a more manageable array of choices for decisionmakers. Yet these conscious and unconscious emotional dynamics are also necessary for our social functioning. Jonathan Mercer notes that “People without emotion may know they should be ethical, and may know they should be influenced by norms, and may know that they should not make disastrous financial decisions, but this knowledge is abstract and inert and does not weigh on their decisions (Mercer 2005: 93). Mercer’s argument is that emotion is vital for an actor to relate to social structures; lacking emotionality, actors find themselves socially incapable of functioning appropriately. The study of foreign policy has stressed the failure policymakers to achieve optimal rationality; rationality here being understood as contextualized by “simplified subjective representations of reality” (Tetlock McGuire 2005: 485). The beliefs and expectations that are evident in decision-making have been found to be significantly shaped by a priori assumptions; that is, as Robert Jervis argues, “… actors tend to perceive what they expect” (2005: 463). Thus, cognitivists argue that familiarity a given social context shapes how a given agent is likely to perceive others (Jervis 2005: 471). In conclusion, it is obvious that the above approaches fixate upon errors in judgement, with emotionality contributing solely to these errors. It is also evident that treating emotion as potentially productive and invariably unavoidable to the study of politics and international relations can provide new interpretations and expectations regarding the human capacity for change, how we are enculturated to feel intensely about abstract concepts, and ultimately why social constructs such as the state or ‘nation’ are capable of motivating individuals to obscene acts of violence including a willingness to sacrifice one’s own life in their name. Works Cited: Bechara, A.; Damasio, H.; Tranel, D.; Damasio, A. R. “Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.” Science, 275.5304 (1997): 1293-1294. Blight, James G. The Shattered Crystal Ball New York: Rowan Littlefield, 1990. Blight, James G. Brenner, Philip. Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers and the Missile Crisis. New York: Rowan Littlefield, 2002. Campos, Joseph J. Barrett, Karen C. “Toward a New Understanding of Emotions and their Development.” in Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan Robert E. Zajonc (eds.), Emotions, Cognition and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Cassino, Dan Lodge, Milton. “The Primacy of Affect in Political Evaluations” in W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Cringler Michael Mackuen (eds.) The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Cohen, Dov Kityayama, Shinobu. “Cultural Psychology: This Stanza and the Next.” in Shinobu Kitayama Dov Cohen (eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York: The Gulford Press, 2007. Crawford, Neta. “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” International Security 24 (2000): 116-156. Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994. Elster, Jon. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fattah, Khaled Fierke, K.M. “A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East.” European Journal of Political Science. 15.1 (2009): 67â€"93 Faizullaev, Alisher. “Diplomacy and Self.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17 (2006): 497â€"522. Fineman, Stephan. “Getting the Measure of Emotion â€" and the Cautionary Tale of Emotional Iintelligence.” Human Relations. 57.6(2004): 719-740. Houghton, David Patrick. Political Psychology. New York: Routledge, 2008 Houghton, David Patrick. “Analogical Reasoning, Neuroscience, and Emotion: Toward a Hot Cognitive Approach.” Paper presented to ISA annual meeting February, 2009. Marcus, G.E. “Emotion in Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2000 3: 221-250. Marcus, G.E. “The Psychology of Emotion and Politics.” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.) Oxford Handbook of political psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. McDermott, Rose. “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science.” Perspectives on Politics. 4 (2004): 691-706. McDermott, Rose. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Mercer, Jonathan. “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.” International Organization 1 (2005): 77-106. Mercer, Jonathan. “Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics.” Journal of International Relations and Development. 2006 9: 288-303. Mesquita, Batja; Leu, Janxin. “The Cultural Psychology of Emotion.” in Shinobu Kitayama Dov Cohen (eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York: The Guilford Press, 2007. Neuman, W. Russell; Marcus, George E.; Cringler, Ann Mackuen, Michael. “Theorizing Affects Effects.” in W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Cringler Michael Mackuen (eds.) The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007 Ross, Andrew A. “Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions,” European Journal of International Relations 12 (2006): 197-222. Rittberger, Volker. Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theory.” Paper presented to ISA annual meeting, March 2002. Stein, Janice Gross. “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat.” Political Psychology, 2 (1988): 245-271. Tetlock, Philip McGuire, Charles. “Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy,” in John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, New York: Longman, 2005: 484-500. Voss, James F. Dorsey, Ellen. “Perception and International Relations: An Overview.” in Eric Singer Valerie Hudson (eds.), Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992. Weber, Cynthia. Faking It: U. S. Hegemony in a Post-Phallic era. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Zajonc, Robert B. “On the Primacy of Affect.” American Psychologist.” 1984 39.2 (1984): 117â€"23.

The Treaty of Tordesillas

Just months after  Christopher Columbus  returned to Europe from his maiden voyage to the New World, the Spanish-born Pope Alexander VI gave Spain a head-start in the quest for domination over newly discovered regions of the world. The Lands of Spain The Pope decreed that all lands discovered west of a meridian 100 leagues (one league is 3 miles or 4.8 km) west of the Cape Verde Islands should belong to  Spain  while new lands discovered east of that line would belong to  Portugal. This papal bull also specified that all lands already under the control of a Christian prince would remain under that same control.​ Negotiating to Move the Line to the West This limiting line made Portugal angry. King John II (the nephew of  Prince Henry the Navigator) negotiated with King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain to move the line to the west. King Johns rationale to Ferdinand and Isabella was that the Popes line extends all around the globe, thus limiting Spanish influence in Asia. The New Line On June 7, 1494, Spain and Portugal met at Tordesillas, Spain and signed a treaty to move the line 270 leagues west, to 370 leagues west of  Cape Verde. This new line (located at approximately 46 ° 37) gave Portugal more claim to South America yet also provided Portugal with automatic control over most of the Indian Ocean. Treaty of Tordesillas Accurately Determined While it would be several hundred years before the line of the Treaty of Tordesillas could be accurately determined (due to problems determining longitude), Portugal and Spain kept to their sides of the line quite well. Portugal ended up colonizing places like Brazil in South America and India and  Macau  in Asia. Brazils Portuguese-speaking population is a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas. Portugal and Spain ignored an order from the Pope in enacting their treaty, but all was reconciled when Pope Julius II agreed to the change in 1506.

Teenagers Are Suffering With Multiple Eating Disorders

In America, many teenagers are suffering with multiple eating disorders. Once they begin to monitor what to eat, they tend to perform many exercise routines followed by the lack of not eating, these situations should be alarming to the parent that something is not right. Thus, what can we do to resolve this situation among teens? Parents should first become informed towards the issue which their child is facing and take action immediately to save their child from the dangerous activities. It is important for them to realize that their child is in great danger once they begin to do any of these tasks. Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa are psychological problems which mostly affect teenagers and causes them to become conscious about their†¦show more content†¦There are multiple types of eating disorders besides Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa, such as binge eating disorder, purging disorder, and night eating syndrome. Atypical Anorexia nervosa as is it most commonly kn own is having a weight that is extremely below the recommended weight. As a result, many of the people who are classified under this eating disorder starve themselves, so that their body can become thin. In some situations, they starve themselves so much that it can at times become fatal. According to the Palo Alto Medical Foundation, approximately 1 % of the adolescent girls will develop this eating disorder and about 20 % of the people struggling with this eating disorder will die prematurely from complications such as, heart problems or suicide (Miller, 2013, para 2). Bulimia Nervosa occurs when the person has an insanity for overeating too much in short periods and this is then followed by binge eating or purging. The main cause for Bulimia is when the patient has a distorted image of themselves and they see something different from what they really look like. Bulimia Nervosa can be categorized as overeating, fasting, or purging. According to the Palo Alto Medical Foundation, th ey say that 3 % of young women will develop Bulimia nervosa. The source also says that about 50 % of the people who had Anorexia will most likly develop Bulimia or Bulimic patterns later on in their life (Miller,

What does china has an ageing population Free Essays

China, the second larges country in the world, is facing a serious problem — ageing population. Before 1979, when Mao was the chairman of China, he persuaded women to have lots of babies in order to finish his plan – the Great Leap Forward. This is the start of the ageing population in China. We will write a custom essay sample on What does china has an ageing population? or any similar topic only for you Order Now In January 1958, Mao launched the second five year plan known as the Great Leap Forward. 1Mao wanted China to become a world power. He wanted to catch up with the west by ending Chinese dependence upon agriculture. His aim was to catch up with UK in the industry products in ten years time and with America in 15 years time. In order to do this, he will need lots of peasants but many of them die during this progress. This is why Mao encouraged women to have lots of children. In the DTM, the birth rate at stage 2 and 3 are both very high and this is due to requirement of Mao. China’s population base increased â€Å"only† by another 100,000,000 on top of its 432,000,000 base.2 The magnitude of China total population increase so much that even the People’s Republic of China found it hard to support. This is when One Child Policy (ICP) came in to control the over growing population. ICP is the birth control policy of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)3. When Deng Xiao Ping took over the power at 1978, he realized the overpopulation is a roadblock to economic development and also the death rate will increase due to the lack of food and water, then he came out with the ICP idea. In general, this policy is very successful because the birth rate has been reduced gradually starting at the middle of stage 3 in the DTM. The 1982 fertility survey shows the total fertility rate falling from around 6.0in the mid-1950s to well below 4.0in 19614. However, ICP leads to some other problem such as the ageing population. Since the ICP is introduced, the population has successfully decreased. However, the infant mortality increases at the same time. This is because as a Chinese tradition, the boys carry the family name but now, the families are only allow to have one child therefore the chance of having a boy is less then before. Because of this, some families may choose to kill the baby if it’s a girl in order to carry the family name. This is not the only effect of ICP, since most families choose to have a boy rather than a girl, there will be more males than female in the future. The difference will also increase as the time pass by. As years go by, the medical care develops a lot in China therefore the life expectancy increase at the same time. Since the birth rate was so high is 1960s but then decrease so much when ICP is introduced, there are depend people then independent people. This slows down the economic development of China. When there are more dependent then the government will need to pay more than it earns. Since the dependent people can not earn their own living, the government will have to give them money and because the numbers of dependent people are so many, the money that was given to the dependents is more than the money China earns. The birth rate keeps dropping in China is due to one other main reason – as most of the people are now educated, they understand that if you want to raise up your children as best as you can, one child is more than enough. Also, the cost of having two children is normally too expensive for lower or middle classes. The time that is taken to look after them is too much if both parents are working. These are the main reasons why most of the parents choose not to have more than one child. In conclusion, China has an ageing population a problem is because the birth rate was really high when Mao was the chairman but then it decreases so much that ICP was introduced. The differences between that get worse and develop as the ageing population. Because of this problem, the economic developments is held back since the input and output is not balance due to part of the income is given to those dependent people. The death rate will increase dramatically when the dependent people die. This will affects reputation of China too. How to cite What does china has an ageing population?, Papers

Pressures of Society on Celebrities Essay Example

Pressures of Society on Celebrities Paper Synthesis Essay: Pressures of Society My topic focuses on societal pressures on celebrities and people. While research may confirm that both celebrities and people have the same problems, you cant help but notice that celebrities are more Judged. This is a highly controversial topic because we are so quick to Judge someone based on their actions without really knowing them. While some people think celebrities are a bad influence some still think they can also have some benefits to the community. People and celebrities go through some of the same problems, the only difference is celebrities have no privacy in their ersonal lives and they are put on a higher pedestal. However, we may never know if the high pressures of society will ever change and be more open minded before judging people based on their outside appearance and mistakes. Jack Marshalls article, The Sexualization of Teen Celebrities Is Ethically Questionable, discusses young teens that idolize stars and want to be Just like them so they dress and act the same. Similarly, Julie Mehta article, Celebrity Culture Promotes Unrealistic Body Images, discusses how the younger generations want to look like celebrities and view that their bodies are not as fit or thin enough. Despite the fact that the articles bring up different questions about how we look up celebrities too much, the authors both argue celebrities are idolized too much. Marshall does this by stating, The early sexualization of TV actresses whose fans are young teens and pre-teens has a strong rippling effect across the culture, encouraging girls to go where their idols appear to be going (Marshal. This statement points out that the younger generation wants to be their idols so much that they start mocking what they do. Mehta begin her argument by saying, Perfect images of perfect celebrities are everywhere, and its nough to make anyone feel insecure or envious. (Mehta. ) The article describes the flawless images of celebrities in the media can disturb ones thought about body image and self-esteem.. She goes on to state, Seeing all those artificially perfected images can hurt your body image- the way you see and feel about your body and the way you think others see you. (Mehta. ) In summary, these articles support the argument that we compare and contrast ourselves to celebrities because we feel like that will get us closer to the glitz and glamor of their life. Another source that talks bout the pressures of society is Chris Hedgess article, Celebrity Culture is Harmful. He discusses how celebrity culture only results to self absorption and materialism. This also connects to the main point of Emily Stimsons article, Celebrity Culture Harms Teens. Their article sheds light on the obsession of celebrities and how dangerous their influence really has on the younger generation. Both articles talks about celebrities fame disturbing our society. Hedges and Stimson both talk about stars lives as only the matter about wealth, fame and dont have a touch of reality. He tates that, gossip and chatter dominate what really matters in the nation (Hedges. ) With this statement one could say he is right, people are more bound to watch television talking about the latest sandal with down spiraling celebrities than watching Fox 4 news talk about the war in Iraq. We will write a custom essay sample on Pressures of Society on Celebrities specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Pressures of Society on Celebrities specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Pressures of Society on Celebrities specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer Stimpson states that, American teenagers are obsessed witn celebrities and becoming tamous, which nas negative emotional and social consequences (Stimpson. ) The authors go on to fully detail what is wrong with our community and their reasons they think that celebrity culture has ruin our society. In conclusion, this research may be used to support that celebrities are idolized too much and once they make a mistake, we throw it out of proportions, and we criticize them for it. While some of the articles focus more on celebrity obsession, the other articles take into consideration that maybe it isnt their fault that they are so corrupted, but because of the pressure of being perfect that corrupts them. When will we realize that we put too much pressure of stars? How will they be able to make a mistake, when to them it feels like they are walking on eggshells? And once they make a mistake we are there to Judge them and talk down n them, because they got caught. No one is perfect, so why do we have such high standards for them to be? We yearn to be center of attention, to be noticed and admired. We build social media sites only for the sole purpose to present our image in the world. Why are willing to give up our privacy to become famous? We have become so infatuated with celebrities and their fame that we watch everything they do so we can do our best to be Just like them. Has our society become so obsessed with money and power that we have lost track on what is really important in the world? That is a better question. Works Cited Marshall, Jack. The Sexualization of Teen Celebrities Is Ethically Questionable. Is Childhood Becoming Too Sexualized. Olivia Ferguson and Hayley Mitchell Haugen. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2010. At Issue. Rpt. from The Ethics of Child Stardom, Part Two: Miley Cyrus in Vanity Fair. Ethics Scoreboard, 2008. Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 23 Oct. 2013. Mehta, Julie. Celebrity Culture Promotes Unrealistic Body Images. Celebrity Culture. Ed. Roman EspeJo. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2011. Opposing Viewpoints. Rpt. from Pretty Unreal: Ever Wish You Could Look as Hot as Celebrities Do? Well, They Dont Look as Good as You Think. Current Health 2, a Weekly Reader Publication Can. 2005): 15(4). Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 17 Oct. 2013. Hedges, Chris. Celebrity Culture Is Harmful. Celebrity Culture. Ed. Roman EspeJo. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2011. Opposing Viewpoints. Rpt. from Addicted to Nonsense. Truthdig. com. 2009. Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 17 Oct. 2013 Stimpson, Emily. Celebrity Culture Harms Teens. Celebrity Culture. Ed. Fame and Misfortune: Why Teens Thirst for Celebrity in Todays Culture. Our Sunday Visitor (1 1 Jan. 2009). Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 17 Oct. 2013.